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Inheritance Corpus Excluded From Child Support
Obligations Under the Pennsylvania Support
Guidelines' Definition of Income: Humphreys v.
DeRoss
FAMILY LAW- CHILD SUPPORT - CALCULATION - INHERITANCE - The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the corpus of an inheri-
tance is excluded from child support calculations under the Sup-
port Guidelines definition of income. However, the court noted
that the best interest analysis can allow for an upward deviation
from the guideline amount when the fact finder determines that
the inheritance is a factor which makes more income available for
support.
Humphreys v. DeRoss, 790 A.2d 281 (Pa. 2002).
William DeRoss's ("DeRoss") mother died in 1997, leaving
DeRoss the sole beneficiary of her estate, which resulted in his
receipt of $83,696.50 from the proceeds of the estate's sale of her
home in 1999.1 DeRoss receives $858.00 in Workers' Compensa-
tion benefits per month, of which twenty percent goes to his attor-
ney and $355.00 in social security disability per month.2 DeRoss
owes child support to his daughter, Angela, who lives with her
adult sister, Beth Humphreys ("Humphreys").3 Humphreys
brought an action against DeRoss in August of 1997, citing
DeRoss's inheritance as a change in circumstance that required
modification of DeRoss's child support obligations.4
A hearing officer reviewed the modification petition and deter-
mined that DeRoss's inheritance was a receipt of income, which
should be prorated for the remainder of Angela's minority for an
upward deviation of DeRoss's child support obligations.5 The trial
court adopted the hearing officer's summary and set the child
support obligations of DeRoss at $615.45, retroactively applicable
1. Humphreys v. DeRoss, 790 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 2002) DeRoss used the inheritance to
purchase a home for his new family. Id.





to August of 1997.6 The court ordered DeRoss to pay $700.00 in
child support to Angela for arrear adjustment.7 DeRoss requested
a de novo review of the child support assessment, and received an
adjustment to $609.45 due to Angela's receipt of additional Social
Security payments not accounted for in the trial court's order.'
DeRoss appealed to the Superior Court, which upheld the trial
court's appraisal that the inheritance received by DeRoss qualified
as income for child support modification.9 The Superior Court de-
termined that the statutory definition of income is not an all in-
clusive express list of items to be considered when making a child
support calculation, and ability to pay from all resources available
to a parent is a factor in the determination.' ° The majority noted
that even if the imputed income from the inheritance was more
than the actual monthly income of DeRoss, the parental duty to
provide for the needs of a minor dependent child will sometimes
result in parental sacrifice to follow a support order." The duty
includes, according to the court, the obligation to give the child the
full reality of the parent's financial security, and this duty has
been uniformly upheld by Pennsylvania courts. 2 The majority
concluded that a lump sum cash inheritance must be considered
income as a part of the complete financial resources available for
support, and that the statutory definition of income includes "enti-
tlements to money without regards to source" which is broad
13enough to properly include the inheritance as income.
The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine whether re-
ceipt of inheritance is income under the Domestic Relations Code
5. Id.
6. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 283. The determination was based in the Support Guide-
lines, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302 using PA.R.CIV.P. 1910.16-2 (Support Guidelines. Calcula-
tion of Net Income)., to determine that $4,525.00 per month in income was available in
addition to the Social Security and Worker's Compensation DeRoss receives for determin-
ing the amount of child support Angela should receive based on DeRoss's gross income.
Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 283.
7. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 283. Arrear is defined as "an unpaid or overdue debt."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 2000). PA.R.CIV.P. 1910.16-2 allows child support
obligations to be under the court's discretion for lump sum income receipts payment ar-
rangements under the facts and circumstances of each case. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 283 n.
2.
8. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 283. A de novo hearing is "an appeal in which the appel-
late court uses the trial court's record, but reviews the evidence and law without deference
to the trial court's rulings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 74 (7 h ed. 2000).
9. Humphreys v. DeRoss, 737 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
10. Id. at 778.
11. Id. at 779.
12. Id.
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for the purposes of calculating child support obligations. 4 The
majority determined that the Superior Court had abused its dis-
cretion in concluding that an inheritance fit the definition of in-
come provided by Section 4302 of the Domestic Relations Code. 5
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court for a
further evaluation of a deviation from the presumptive amount of
support set by the Support Guidelines through a review of the im-
pact of the inheritance on the payor's cost of living expenses. 6
The Supreme Court began its discussion of the issue in Hum-
phreys by reestablishing the general rule that a review of child
support matters is determined by the abuse of discretion stan-
dard." The majority then began its analysis by reviewing the
statutory definition of income instituted by the Domestic Relations
Code. 8 The Court also established that the plain meaning of
statutory construction of the definition of income provides that
only items that fit reasonably into an enumerated category of the
13. Id.
14. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 282. Domestic Relations Code, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302
defines income as including:
[Clompensation for services, including but not limited to, wages, salaries, bonuses,
fees, compensation in kind, commissions and similar items; income derived from
business; gains from dealing in property; interest; rents; royalties; dividends; annui-
ties; income from all life insurance and endowment contracts; all forms of retirement;
pensions; income from discharge of indebtedness; distributive share of partnership
gross income; income in respect of a decedent; income from an interest in an estate or
trust; military retirement benefits; railroad employment retirement benefits; social
security benefits; temporary and permanent disability benefits; worker's compensa-
tion; unemployment compensation; other entitlements to money or lump sum awards,
without reference to source, including lottery winnings; income tax refunds; insur-
ance compensation or settlements; awards or verdicts; and any form of payment due
to and collectable by an individual regardless of source.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302 (1985).
15. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 288.
16. Id. PA.R.CIv.P. 1910 16-5(b)(5),(9) allows the trier of fact to deviate from the Sup-
port Guidelines presumptive amount through review of relevant factors including assets of
the parties and best interest standard for the minor. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 287-288. The
court reasoned that inheritance is not income, but it still might allow a deviation from
Support Guidelines to benefit the child, if the trier of fact can justify reasons for finding an
upward deviation of child support in writing, which would be a procedural adjustment of
child support independent from the statutory definition of income under PA.R.CIV.P.
1910.16-5(a). Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 287-88.
17. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 283. Abuse of discretion standard is "[n]ot merely an error
of judgement, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the
judgement exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused." Id. (quoting Blue v.
Blue, 616 A.2d 628, 631 (Pa. 1992)).
18. Id. at 283-84.
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statute can be deemed income for child support purposes. 9 The
next section of the analysis outlined four categories of the statu-
tory definition of income that an inheritance might reasonably
fit.
20
The majority opinion included the examination of four statutory
categories within the definition of income: "income in respect of a
decedent;" "income from an interest in an estate or trust;" "other
entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without regard to
source, including lottery winnings;" and "any form of payment due
to and collectable by an individual regardless of source."21 The
first category appraised was "income in respect of a decedent",
which was determined not to apply to an inheritance by the ter-
minology of the definition alone.22 Next evaluated was "income
from an interest in an estate or trust" which was resolved to be
inapplicable to inheritances in general because the statute specifi-
cally provides for the interest in an estate or trust, but not the es-
tate or trust's corpus, so that the plain meaning of the statute was
to exclude the corpus of an estate from income. Then the major-
ity reviewed "other entitlements to money or lump sum awards,
without regard to source, including lottery winnings," for which
the court illustrated that when the legislature allowed a specified
category dealing with estates that omitted any reference to inheri-
tances, then the intent could not reasonably be to mass inheri-
tances in with other lump sum settlements.24 Lastly the "any form
19. Id. at 284. (reviewing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302, supra note 14; and distinguishing
Darby v. Darby, 686 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)), allocatur denied, 698 A.2d 594
(Pa. 1997), in which the Superior Court's conclusion that "income" is not an all-inclusive list
due to language of including, but not limited to. The court establishes that the language
was exclusive to the types of compensation for services that would constitute income, but
not the entire statutory definition of income). Id.
20. Id. at 284-85.
21. Id. (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302, supra note 14.)
22. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 284-285. The court does not go beyond this statement in
their opinion. Id. The definition of decedent is, "[a] dead person, esp[ecially] one who died
recently." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (7t' ed. 2000). The definition of income in respect of
a decedent has no further explanation of the phrase in the statute. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §
4302.
23. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 285. The court reasoned that an inheritance is such a
common means to transfer wealth that to not specifically include an inheritance and to only
provide for an interest in an estate showed legislative intent to exclude the corpus of the
estate from income. Id. Corpus is Latin for body, defined as "the principle, as opposed to an
interest or income". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (7"h ed. 2000). The court expressed legis-
lative intent for the separation of interest from the corpus of an estate, due to the specific
language used. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 285.
24. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 285. The court stated that any other interpretation of
legislative intent would "defy logic". Id. This section of the statute was added to the defini-
tion on December 16, 1997, while Humphreys was being decided, and was retroactively
244 Vol. 41
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of payment due to and collectable by an individual regardless of
source" category, in the majority's view, only applied to compensa-
tion or discharge of debt and does not incorporate a common form
of transfer through an inheritance by the general phrase "regard-
less of source."25
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after determining that in-
heritance did not fit in any category of income provided in the
Domestic Relation Code, evaluated the definition of income in the
context of the Support Guidelines to determine if legislative intent
was to include inheritances as income available for child support.2 6
The Support Guidelines' 1998 Amendment discusses income, de-
fined by the Domestic Relations Code, as an average of at least six
months "including income from any source."27 The Court reestab-
lished that the purpose of the Support Guidelines is that "persons
similarly situated, shall be treated similarly" and applied this
principle to resolve the issue of whether an inheritance as income
would reflect the purpose of the Guidelines.28  Illustrating
DeRoss's circumstance in contrast to another person with an ac-
tual monthly cash flow of the amount calculated by the trial court
to be available to DeRoss, the court determined that the purpose
of the guidelines was not to ignore the economic reality of two dif-
29ferently situated persons. Citing an earlier Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court case, the majority stressed that the primary impor-
tance of the Guidelines is the reasonableness of the amount of
support based on affordability and the necessity of the amount to
applied in this case because it only affected remedies, and did not disturb any vested right
which is required to have a retroactive law pass constitutional scrutiny. Id at 284 n.3.
25. Id. at 285 n. 6. (citing Justice Eakin's, then Judge Eakin, dissenting opinion in the
Superior Court's prior judgment of Humphreys). Justice Eakin did not participate in the
Supreme Court's review of Humphreys. Id. at 288.
26. Id. at 285. The context of the Support Guidelines is found in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §
4322(a), which provides in part:
Child... support shall be awarded pursuant to a statewide guideline as established by
general rule by the Supreme Court, so that persons similarly situated shall be
treated similarly. The guideline shall be based upon the reasonable needs of the
child.. the ability of the obligor to provide support... plac[ing] primary emphasis on
the net incomes and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable deviation for
unusual needs... and other factors, such as party's assets.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322(a) (1985).
27. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 285-286.
28. Id. at 286. (reviewing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322(a), see supra note 25). The court
uses the amendment to show the significance of the relationship between the Statutory
Guideline and the Domestic Relation code's statutory definition of income, which before the
amendment was not directly linked. Id at 286 n.7. But see, PA.R.CIV.P. 1910.16-2. (the
amendment also underscores the inclusion of income from any source).
29. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 286.
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further the welfare of the child.3" The majority also concluded that
disparity results by treating an inheritance as income when typi-
cally intact families do not use inheritances to meet living ex-
penses and, as a result, treating inheritances as income available
for support is not aligned with the purpose of the Guidelines."1
The majority's analysis then turned to other jurisdictions'
treatment of inheritance as income by reviewing cases in Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Montana, New Jersey, Washing-
ton, and Wisconsin, because Humphreys was a case of first im-
pression in Pennsylvania. 2 Many courts have ruled that inheri-
tance itself is not income, but interest generated from inheritance
is income for child support classifications.33 Other courts cited in
the Superior Court's analysis supporting an inheritance as income
were disposed of by the majority through determining that the
courts were dealing with either a fact-specific finding, a different
statutory definition of income or a different subject matter.4
The conclusion of the court, after reviewing the statutory defini-
tion, the Support Guidelines, and the treatment of the issue in
other jurisdictions, was that the difference between the corpus of
an estate and the interest from an estate was applicable to the
facts of DeRoss's inheritance which only consisted of a corpus of an
inheritance." Furthermore, the majority noted that any issues
surrounding the Support Guidelines presumptive amount could be
appropriately dealt with through deviation based on factors such
as assets of the parties and best interests of the minor. 6 The in-
heritance could allow an upward modification of support, not un-
der the definition of income, but by a factual examination that
concludes that the financial obligations of the payor are decreased
30. Id. (citing Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. 1994)). Ball also states that
reasonable expenses of the payor and reasonable needs of the child are factors in determin-
ing the appropriate amount of support. Ball, 648 A.2d at 1197. See infra note 72.
31. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 286. but see, dissenting opinion at 290.
32. Id at 286-87.
33. Id at 286. (citing Robinson v. Robinson, 961 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1998); Halter v.
Halter, 959 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1998); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 831 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1992);
Stula v. Stula, 1998 WL 457694 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Connell v. Connell, 712 A.2d 1266.
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); and Gainey v. Gainey, 948 P.2d 865. (Wash. 1997). See
also Gal v. Gal, 937 S.W.2d 391(Mo. 1997) and Lenderman v. Lenderman 460 N.W.2d 781
(Mo. 1990)).
34. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 287. (citing Crayton v. Crayton, 944 P.2d 487 (Alaska
1997); Goldberg v. Goldberg 698 So. 2d 63 (La. 1997); Forsythe v. Forsythe, 41 Va. Cir. 82
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1996)).
35. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 287.
36. Id. at 287-88. (citing PA.R.CIV.P. 1910.16-5(b)(5),(9)). The court notes that Rule
1910.16-5(a) has requirements of written justification for deviation. Id at 288.
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by the inheritance, making more of the payor's income available
for child support." The resulting rule of law from the majority
opinion is that the corpus of an estate is not income for child sup-
port purposes, however, it can be a factor for an upward modifica-
tion of support obligations if the fact finder can justify a finding
that more income is available for child support to allow a deviation
from the presumed amount.38
The dissent of Justice Castille, joined by Justice Nigro, focused
not on a general issue of exclusion of the term inheritance from
the statutory definition of income as the majority did, but instead
reviewed the rules of statutory construction in reference to the
definition of income as applied to the specific facts of the case."
Justice Castille began his analysis by focusing on the appropriate
reading of the statute and distinguishing the majority's reading as
"contrary to [its] plain meaning and creates an unnecessary con-
flict between the statute and [the court's] procedural rules."'° Ac-
cording to the dissent, the plain language of the pertinent provi-
sions control during statutory interpretation, and the facts of the
case must be applied to the statute under its plain language which
results in the inheritance reasonably fitting within the statutory
definition of income.41
The minority analysis reestablished the fact that the inheri-
tance received was a cash distribution to DeRoss, reviewed the
statutory definition of income in general, developed the specific
sections to which DeRoss's inheritance could reasonably fit within
and cited the flaws of the interpretation of the majority.42 The gen-
eral statutory analysis of Justice Castille, concluded that the
"definition of income is varied and intentionally broad."'3 The
statute, according to the dissent's interpretation, comprises spe-
cific conventional sources of income, less ordinary specific catego-
37. Id. at 288.
38. Id. The court also stated that a finding for upward deviation must follow
PA.R.CIv.P. 1910.16-5, which was adopted while this case was pending and became effec-
tive in 1999 through gleaning former rule 1910.16-4 that was in effect during the original
trial. Id at 288 n. 8.
39. Id. at 288. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
40. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 287. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
41. Id. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).The plain meaning rule is defined as, "[tihe rule
that if a writing, or provision in a writing, appears to be unambiguous on its face, its mean-
ing must be determined from the writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 938 (7thed. 2000).
42. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 289-91. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
43. Id. at 289. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
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ries of income, and non-specific, expansive categories of income."
After reviewing the statutory definition of income in general, the
minority concluded that the facts of DeRoss's inheritance could
reasonably fit into either "income from an estate or trust", "other
entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without regard to
source," or "any form of payment due to and collectable by an indi-
vidual... regardless of source."45
The minority's analysis continued with the overview of the three
categories, the application of majority's analysis to these catego-
ries, and the resulting inconsistencies with the majority's ration-
ale.46 The first category reviewed was "an interest in an estate or
trust," which Justice Castille noted "does not read interest income
from a corpus of an estate," as the majority interpreted, but
broadly applies to any income that results from an interest in an
estate. 47 The minority concluded that the interest referred to in
the statute is not interest income, but an interest in an estate ac-
cording to the plain reading of the statute, which removes the ne-
cessity of the General Assembly to use the specific word inheri-
tance to make clearer the meaning behind the intention to include
inheritances within the definition of income. 48  The majority's
treatment of the absence of the word inheritances, based on the
unsupported conclusion that inheritances are commonly used to
transfer income, was problematic for the dissent because the mi-
nority noted that inheritances often include items of no economic
value that are properly left out of the Code's definition of "interest
in an estate that produces income."' Further, the dissent argued
44. Id. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). The dissent cited 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302 to
show that "compensation for services", "interest income", and "social security" as traditional
income sources, "income from an interest in an estate or trust" as a less common source of
income, and "other entitlements to money.. without regard to source" and "any form of
payment due to and collectable by an individual.. .without regard to source" are non-
inclusive general definitions of income. Id. at 288.
45. Id. at 288. (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302) (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
46. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 289-291. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). The dissent
noted that using the word inheritances might bring additional problems due to the different
ways a person might inherit. Id.
47. Id. at 289. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
48. Id. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). Interest is defined as an, "[a]dvantage or
profit, esp[ecially] of a financial nature [or].. .[a] legal share in something; all or part of a
legal or equitable claim to or right in property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (7th ed.
2000).
49. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 289. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). The dissent also
noted that DeRoss used the interest in the estate to purchase a home for his new family,
which presumes that the interest produced income that was also available for the support
of his daughter, Angela. Id.
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that even if the majority's interpretation of a significant difference
between the corpus and the interest in an estate were substanti-
ated, the fact that DeRoss's inheritance included the corpus which
was the house and the interest which was the proceeds from its
sale, resulted in an erroneous resolution that DeRoss's inheritance
was not income under the majority analysis. °
The next sections of the statutory definition of income reviewed
were the inclusive sections of the definition of income, from enti-
tlements and any payments due, both from any source, which
were broad enough, according to Justice Castille to include inheri-
tances due to the terminology, "regardless of source", in both cate-
gories of income.5 The majority's dismissal of these options based
on the lack of the word inheritance is contrary to the plain mean-
ing of the statutes inclusive terminology and, according to the dis-
sent, resulted in a "unilateral creation of an inheritance exception
to the broad, plain statutory language." 2 In addition to the un-
founded creation of the inheritance exception, the justification for
the exception is groundless to the dissent because of the majority's
assumption of how intact families use inheritances verses non-
intact families, is directly rebutted by the treatment of DeRoss's
inheritance with his current intact family for purchases of a basic
living expense, a new house.53
The dissent illustrated that the effect of the majority's rule upon
the current law of child support undermines the legislative intent
by judicial procedure.54 The dissent argued that "whether this
Court's procedural rules can, or should, establish a substantive
support consequence where the Code itself, under the majority's
conclusion, has not," also results in an "unnecessary discrepancy
between the statute and this Court's procedural Rules" due to the
majority's failure to follow the plain meaning of the statute. 5 The
conclusion reached by the minority was that no error resulted in
the recognition that the specific facts of DeRoss's inheritance was
50. Id. at 289-290. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). But see, Id. at 285 n. 4.
51. Id. at 290. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
52. Id. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority's approach
"turns statutory construction on its head." Id.
53. Id. at 290. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). The dissent also challenged how the
unfounded presumption has any bearing on the correct interpretation of the Code. Id.
54. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 291. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
55. Id. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting).
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income available for a modification of support and an inheritance
is income under the Code's definition.56
Although the common law duty of parents to support their chil-
dren "is well nigh absolute," the appropriate calculation of child
support has long been a controversy in Pennsylvania.57
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their
children is a principle of natural law... laid on them, not only
by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing
them into the world... By begetting them, therefore, they have
entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in
them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be
supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the
perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents...."'
The basis of a support obligation to children rests squarely upon
well-established rules of child support that are reiterated in depth
through Pennsylvania common law.59 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that parents are subject to make personal sacrifices
to provide for their children; the primary purpose of support is the
best interest and the welfare of the children; awards are not to be
unjust or expropriate to the parent; and both parents share an
equal responsibility to provide support to their children finan-
cially, which is based in the capacity of a parent and determined
by extent of property available, actual income, earning capacity
and standard of living which the parent enjoys through the deci-
sion of Conway v. Dana." The Superior Court of Pennsylvania fur-
ther established that the evaluation of parental support obliga-
tions begins with the parent's income from whatever source, or
their earning capacity, and then continues with a review of the
full reality of the parent's assets and financial resources in the
56. Id. (Castille, Nigro, JJ., dissenting). The dissent noted that the calculation of sup-
port under a lump sum payment is under the discretion of the trial court and saw no abuse
of discretion with respect to the support award under the facts of the case. Id. at 291 n.1.,
supra note 7.
57. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Ribikauskas, 68 Pa. D.&C. 336 at 338 (1949) (quoting
Judge Arnold's often cited statement in Commonwealth ex rel. v. Firestone, 45 A.2d 913
(1946).
58. Ribikauskas, 68 Pa. D.&C. 336 at 337. (1949). (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES 446, Lewis ed., 1922.)
59. Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974); Hagerty v. Eyster, 429 A.2d 665 (Pa.
1981); and Butler v. Butler, 488 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 1984) (These cases restate basic principles
that are used in determinating child support obligations).
60. 318 A.2d at 325-26 (Pa. 1974). (re-establishes that the parents' responsibility is to
support their children) Id.
Vol. 41250
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case of Hagerty v. Eyster.61 Lastly, the Superior Court held that
the review of financial resources includes all assets, regardless of
source, and that a tort award is properly included in the assess-
ment of support, because "it would, indeed, call into question the
sanity of the law if this court was to rule that the tort award is
available to pay debts to 'the butcher the baker and the candle-
stick maker' but not debts to... [the] child for support."'
The generalized rules of Pennsylvania support law were without
guidelines until the 1984 judgment of Melzer v. Witsberger.6" The
issue in Melzer was whether both parents had failed to prove an
entitlement to the other for child support, but the Supreme Court
instead established a uniform guideline for child support calcula-
tions and remanded the issue to be determined under the guide-
lines the court had devised.' The Melzer court determined that
although the amount of support is fully under the discretion of the
fact finder, the court is guided by a conglomerate of well estab-
lished rules and principles that lack a general organization for
their application and interaction. 5 By what is now referred to as
the Melzer guidelines, the court created a formula for determining
the calculation of child support: the needs of the child calculated
by the reasonable expenses of raising the child; the respective
abilities of each parent to pay which is dependent upon property,
income, earning capacity, and resources minus reasonable living
expenses, and a formula in which these classifications fit within
for the calculation of support.66 The Melzer decision also finalized
issues of subsequent families sharing expenses with the child sup-
port obligor, which is used only for consideration of a non-parental
spouse's income off-setting the payor spouse's cost of living, not as
additional money available for support.67 With the black letter of
the law firmly in place regarding the calculation of child support,
Pennsylvania then adopted the statutory Support Guidelines for
calculation of income for child support within a year of Melzer,
limiting Melzer's current application to cases with joint spousal
income higher than the guideline amounts.68
61. 429 A.2d at 668.
62. Butler, 488 A.2d at 1143.
63. 480 A.2d 991 (Pa. 1984).
64. Id. at 994, 998.
65. Id. at 994.
66. Id. at 994-96.
67. Id. at 998.
68. PA.R.CIV.P. 1910.16-2(c)(2) (1981).
Fall 2002
Duquesne Law Review
In 1985, Pennsylvania adopted the Support Guidelines that en-
compass both statutory provisions for child support and Rules of
Civil Procedure for the application of the guidelines in support
matters, which became effective in January of 1986.69 The Sup-
port Guidelines' purpose is to ensure that, "persons similarly situ-
ated shall be treated similarly" which is accomplished by focusing
primarily on the reasonable needs of the children and ability of
the parent to provide support by emphasizing the net incomes and
earning capacities of both spouses and allowing standards for de-
viation when necessary." The current statute provides a defini-
tion of income, which was amended in 1996 and 1997 to expand
the statutory definition of income.71 The current Rules of Civil
Procedure refer directly to the calculation of support including
income as defined by the statute, what deductions from income are
allowed to arrive at the monthly net income, and specific treat-
ment of low, high and fluctuating income for support calcula-
tions.7' The Pennsylvania Support Guidelines are based on an
Income Shares Model which provides that the support of a child
should be based on the extent of separated parents' joint income
that would have been available for the child if the parents lived
together.7" Therefore, the amount the obligor can afford and the
amount needed by the child to further the child's welfare is pre-
sumed to be the same for parties that have the same level of in-
come.74 The current Rules of Civil Procedure also specifically al-
low for deviation in accordance with the statutory purpose by list-
ing considerations, in addition to "all relevant factors including
69. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322(1998), and PA.R.CIV.P. No. 1910.16-1 to 16-5. See 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 4302 (1998).
70. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322(a).
71. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302. The 1996 amendment made "or other entitlements to
money or lump sum awards, without regard to source" a part of the statutory definition of
income. October 16, P.L., 706 No. 124, §3, effective, December 16, 1996. The 1997 amend-
ment added "bonuses and lottery winnings, income tax refunds, insurance compensation or
settlements, awards or verdicts, and any form of payment due to and collectable by an
individual regardless of source." December 16, P.L., No. 58, §1.1, effective January 1, 1998.
72. PA.R.CIv.P. 1910.16-2. See, subsection (a) listing that gross monthly income is a six
month average of income as defined by the support law, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302, but
stating specifically: "The statute lists many types of income including, but not limited to:"
and then lists the categories of income defined by §4302. Id. (Therefore, some inconstancy
remains between the statute and the rules of civil procedure for calculating income due to
the recent Humphreys analysis. See Humphreys, 790 A.2d 281 at 285-286.)
73. Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. 1994). This portion of Ball was cited in
Humphreys to support the economic reality of intact and non-intact family portion of the
majority's decision. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 286.
74. Ball, 648 A.2d at 1197.
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the best interests of the child," to be taken into account when cal-
culating if the amount of support under the guidelines is inappli-
cable to either the child's needs or the parent's ability to pay."'
The statutory development of the support guidelines helped to
solidify the well-established child support rules of the common
law, and the interpretation of the statutory definition of income
has recently been explored in the 1996 determination of Darby v.
Darby.7" The issue in Darby was whether a lump sum payment for
a tort award is income available for child support awards.77 The
superior court determined that lump sum awards were included in
the statutory definition of income due to the statutory phrase, "in-
cluding but not limited to" as an indication that the definition was
not intended to be an exclusive list of all possible sources of in-
come.7" The court also relied on the inclusion of lump sum awards
prior to the adoption of the statute demonstrated in prior case
law.79 The result of Darby was that the court determined lump
sum awards to be income, although the statute does not specifi-
cally provide for its inclusion as an enumerated item in the defini-
tion because the statute was not intended to be an exclusive list."0
The legislative approval of the inclusion of lump sum awards was
thereafter codified through the adoption of the 1996 amendment
to the statutory definition of income that specifically provides for
"or other entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without re-
gard to source."8 '
Although Pennsylvania's only case regarding the treatment of
inheritances on the obligations of child support was the 2002 hold-
75. PA.R.Cv.P. No. 1910.16-5.(b), See, 1910.16-5(b)(9).
76. 686 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
77. Darby, 686 A.2d at 1348.
78. Id. (But See supra note 17, where this interpretation is reversed by the Supreme
Court in Humphreys). See supra note 79, (listing other cases that have made inclusions on
the statutory definition of income under the same rationale).
79. Darby, 686 A.2d at 1349. See Butler, 488 A.2d 1141 (Tort award is income, even to
extent that award covered pain and suffering).
80. Id. See also Fichthorn v. Fichthorn, 533 A.2d 1388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (Bonuses
were included as income available for child support awards, although not provided for in
statute); Babish v. Babish, 521 A.2d 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (Lump sum worker's com-
pensation awards were income for determining child support, although not listed in stat-
ute); Hyde v. Hyde, 618 A.2d 406 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (Alimony payments to wife were
available income for determining child support, although not an enumerated item); Alex-
ander v. Armstrong, 609 A.2d 183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (Military allowance and variable
housing allowance were income for child support purposes, although not provided for in the
statute); and Melley v. Schuster, 20 Pa. D.&C.4th 89 (1993) (Public assistance is income for
child support calculation, although not listed in the statutory definition).
81. October 16, P.L., 706 No. 124, §3, effective December 16, 1996.
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ing in Humphreys, foreign jurisdictions have specifically dealt
with the effect of inheritances on child support obligations over
the past decade.82 Foreign decisions regarding child support and
inheritances has resulted in a split authority of treatment, result-
ing in the inclusion of inheritance as imputed income, inclusion for
deviation purposes, or inclusion of actual or imputed interest on
the inheritance as income available for child support." Missouri,
Louisiana, Tennessee, Alaska, and Virginia have held that inheri-
tances can be imputed or included as income available for child
support obligations.84
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that an inheritance can be
imputed as income under the discretion of the court, in Gal v.
Gal.85 The issue in Gal was whether an inheritance was income
available for support.86 The court determined that imputing in-
come to a parent was under the discretion of the court, and the
mother who was living off of the inheritance was continuing her
education and therefore making an attempt to improve her earn-
ing potential.87 The controlling rule of law, according to the Mis-
souri court, was that imputing income when calculating child sup-
port was based on considerations of past, present and future earn-
ing ability, and the inheritance was used to improve future earn-
ings and, therefore, was not required to be imputed for child sup-
port purposes." The purpose of imputing income applies when a
parent is underemployed or unemployed to prevent escaping fi-
nancial responsibilities to provide child support, and the facts of
Gal, according to the court, clearly demonstrated that the inheri-
tance was used to aid future support and, as a result, not required
to be imputed.8
The Louisiana court held that inheritances are properly in-
cluded in determining alimony awards, and that the custodial
spouse's receipt of an inheritance is properly used to defeat a
claim for a larger amount for child support from the non-
82. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 286-87.
83. Id. at 286-87.
84. See Gal, 937 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. 1997); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 698 So.2d 63. (La. 1997);
Ford v. Ford, 1998 WL 730201 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Crayton v. Crayton, 944 P.2d 487
(Alaska 1997); and Forsythe v. Forsythe, 1996 WL 1065613 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996).
85. 937 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. App. 1997).






inheriting spouse, in the 1997 case Goldberg v. Goldberg.9 ° The
facts of Goldberg are extraordinary in that the husband lost a
$160,000 a year job and the wife, who had never been employed
during the marriage, had inherited in excess of one million dol-
lars.91 The assessment of whether the child support award from
the father should be based on the prior standard of living to which
the children had been accustomed to had been resolved by the
court through the use of an expected future salary amount that
the father could reasonably be expected to generate, a review
within six months of the award, and the conclusion that the in-
heritance is the only source that could maintain the standard of
living to which the children had been previously afforded.92 The
balance struck in the Louisiana court was to not eliminate the fa-
ther's responsibilities, although he was currently without em-
ployment, but to shift the primary responsibility of the child sup-
port maintenance on the mother due to her inheritance while im-
puting income on the father based on the reasonable amount he
could be expected to earn.93 The conclusion in the Goldberg court
was not that an inheritance is income directly, but the effect of the
decision was that the parent receiving the inheritance was to be
the substantial provider until future circumstances allowed for a
modification of the support order based on the actual earnings of
the father in the six month review period.94
The Tennessee court held that it was proper to impute income to
a recipient of an inheritance for child support obligations, in the
1998 case of Ford v. Ford.95 The inheritance was placed in a trust
that provided annual payments that the court determined was
income under the statute.96 The statute was broad enough to in-
clude all funds received from the trust, according to the court, be-
cause the statute provided that income is "all income from any
source... whether earned or unearned."97 The conclusion of the
Ford court was that the payor spouse received income in both the
corpus and the interest of the trust, but the court specifically
found that life insurance proceeds should not be included as in-
90. 698 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 1997).
91. Id. at 67-68.




96. Id. at 4.
97. Id. at 4-5 Tenn.Comp. R & Regs r124Q2-4-.03(3)(a).
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come because it was a one-time distribution.98 The Ford court's
holding was dependent upon the stability of the item's continued
receipt for determining whether it is available for support, to en-
sure that speculation by the court will not increase obligations,
but where receipt is not speculative it will be included.99
The Supreme Court of Alaska determined that retroactive sup-
port obligations could be based on the income available at the time
support was sought which includes gifts from third parties to the
obligor spouse, in the 1997 holding of Crayton v. Crayton. °° The
issue resolved in Crayton was whether gifts should be included as
income for past due child support calculations."' The court's con-
cern surrounding the inclusion of inheritances and one-time gifts
as income was that it would unfairly inflate prospective obliga-
tions beyond ascertainable resources."' The facts of Crayton dis-
tinguish a support obligation for a past time frame from policy
concerns of the court regarding continuous future awards, which
resulted in the inclusion of gifts as income for determining past
due support. 3
Virginia resolved the issue of whether an inheritance was in-
come for purposes of determining the correct amount of spousal
support owed to an inheriting spouse when the spouses agreed to
use the child support statutory definition of income, in the 1996
decision of Forsythe v. Forsythe.0 The Virginia statute provided
that income is broadly defined under child support statutory defi-
nition, and that the definition of child support income is inten-
tionally more inclusive than the statute governing spousal sup-
port. The Forsythe court's inclusion of inheritance as income
under the child support statute was because the statute specifi-
98. Id. at 4-5. (See, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302 specifically provides for life insurance
proceeds to be included as income, and the interest payments from trusts would be pro-
vided for in the income from an interest in an estate or trust category of the Pennsylvania
statutory definition of income. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302).
99. Id. at 4.
100. 944 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1997).
101. Id. at 490.
102. Id.
103. Id. The dissent noted that the statute specifically provides that only interest from
gifts or inheritances can be considered as income for future child support obligations, but
the majority's analysis was based on policy considerations, not statutory language. Id. at
490-491. The differential treatment between child support and past due child support
clearly lacks the applicable policy rule in Pennsylvania that "persons similarly situated are
treated similarly." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322.
104. 1996 WL 1065613 at *2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
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cally named gifts as income."' The Court concluded that inheri-
tances are testamentary gifts because the principle from an in-
heritance can be used without limitation by an heir.1"7 The Court
came to this conclusion by comparing the statutory definition of
income that includes only the income from a trust, because the
principle of a trust cannot be reached without restrictions by a
trustee, with an inheritance that has no restrictions on use of the
principle by the beneficiary.' This distinction led the Forsythe
court to hold that an inheritance is income for determining
spousal support when using the child support statutory definition
of income. 0 9
Other jurisdictions in New York, New Jersey, and California
have held that inheritances allow a deviation from the amount of
child support obligation required by statute, although inheritances
are not treated as income for determining the initial amount of
support a parent owes, but is used to supplement that amount or
to justify the award of a lump sum payment of support to the
child."' The New York appellate court held that a lump sum
award for child support based upon a parent's receipt of a lump
sum inheritance was under the discretion of the trial court, al-
though the amount awarded was inappropriate due to the effect
the award would have on the inheriting spouse, in Bryant v. Bry-
ant."' The issue in Bryant was whether the children of a parent
who receives an inheritance should be awarded a share of the in-
heritance as additional child support, and whether the interest
generated from the inheritance is income for the calculation of the
basic child support amount."' The New York statute, according to
the court, provides specifically for the treatment of inheritances as
not income, but grounds for deviation for basic child support obli-
gations due to their nature as "non-recurring payments from ex-
traordinary sources not otherwise considered as income...", but
the interest generated from an inheritance is used to determine
the basic parental obligation of support."' The court reasoned
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Forsythe, 1996 WL 1065613 at *3.
110. See Bryant v. Bryant, 235 A.D.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Connell v. Connell, 712
A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1998); and Kern v. Castle, 75 Cal.App.4"h 1442 (Cal. App. 1999), 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 874 (Cal. 1999).
111. Bryant, 235 A.D.2d at 116.
112. Id. at 118-19.
113. Id. at 120.
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that, although the statute prohibits the treatment of inheritances
as income for the calculation of basic support, it also specifically
provides for an additional award over the basic support obliga-
tions that results in the determination resting with the trial court
if a lump sum distribution is appropriate. 14  The trial court in
Bryant awarded a lump sum portion of the inheritance to the child
for additional support, but the amount of the award was one
fourth of the inheritance which would require the parent to sell
assets to be able to maintain the obligation of the lump sum sup-
port amount."5 The holding of the Bryant court was that a lump
sum distribution is under the trial court's discretion and can be
fairly imposed if circumstances are such that considering whether
the combined income, pro rata share of basic support, reduction of
payor spouse's income to poverty, and additional award would be
unfair or unjust based on the support amount previously im-
posed."6 Specifically, the Bryant court directed the trial court, in
its remand, to determine if another way to fashion the support
award could avoid the necessity of selling assets to fulfill the sup-
port obligation, although the trial court could, upon reviewing all
facts and circumstances, uphold the initial award amount if the
determination is based on the standard of review asserted by the
appellate court."'
The New Jersey court also allowed a supplemental award of
child support in addition to a basic support obligation due to an
inheritance received by the payor spouse in the case of Connell v.
Connell."8 The issue in Connell was whether an inheritance re-
ceived by the payor spouse is considered in determining child sup-
port calculations."9 The trial court concluded that children have a
right to inherited money to be included in the support calculation
even if the money had been invested in property that did not pro-
duce interest and this determination was upheld on review. 20 The
appellate court, however, disagreed with how the inheritance was
factored into a support obligation, and determined that imputing
income based on the inherited funds is applicable, as well as as-
sets and other financial resources, when reviewing the actual cir-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bryant, 235 A.D.2d at 123.
117. Id.
118. 712 A.2d 1266 (N.J. Super. 1998).




cumstances of the parents and no distinction exists between
earned and unearned income. 2' The inheritance was voluntarily
placed in non-income producing property which does not remove it
from child support calculations, and therefore, interest will be im-
puted when no actual interest is generated through the election of
a parent to spend the inheritance.'2 The Connell court concluded
that all of the principle or a portion of the principle can be used to
impute income to the parent with a support obligation depending
upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the inheritance, to
supplement the base support award with additional available
SM.123sums.
12
California has held that an inheritance should be treated differ-
ently under the facts and circumstances of each case, under the
decision of Kern v. Castle.'4 The issue in Kern was whether the
trial court abused its discretion when after in excess of one million
dollar inheritance was received by the obligor parent, the child
support obligation was only increased twenty dollars a month by
only factoring in the rental income received from inherited prop-
erty. 25 The statutory definition of income was silent as to the
treatment of inheritances and the appellate court held that the
trial court could not consider inheritance when determining child
support when the payor spouse's base child support obligation was
in excess of the minimal basic support amount required by stat-
ute.' 26 The Kern court, however, specified that the trial court had
the discretion to determine that the lump sum cash distribution
under the inheritance was not income, but the interest that could
have been earned on the sum should be imputed as income for ba-
sic child support calculations' 2 ' The court also specified that the
only basis for not including the lump sum cash distribution as in-
come was based on the trial court's undocumented conclusion that
the cash distribution was property and therefore an asset that did
not have to be considered in child support calculations .1'  The
holding of the Kern court was that the trial court had discretion
due to the fact that the child support obligation was set at a level
121. Id. at 1269.
122. Id.
123. Connell, 712 A-2d at 1270.
124. 89 Cal.Rptr.2d at 874.
125. Id. at 875.
126. Id. at 879-80.
127. Id. at 882.
128. Id. at 883.
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higher than the minimal amount provided by statute due to the
payor spouse's actual income level.'29 However, the Kern court
also held that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to
at least consider the amount of the reduction on the cost of living
by the inheritance when determining income available for support,
and, therefore, the trial court failed to provide any rationale for
failing to consider the inheritance as income, imputed income, or
any other calculation. ' ° The child not sharing in the wealth cre-
ated by the inheritance is against public policy and the trial court
on remand must consider if the inheritance, the imputed interest
from the inheritance, the underemployment caused by the inheri-
tance, and/or the reduction in the cost of living due to the inheri-
tance should be included as income for the purposes of child sup-
port calculation and state its reasons if any should not be in-
cluded.'3 '
Courts in Colorado, Arkansas, and Washington have held that
only the amount of interest that the principle inheritance could
have generated can be imputed as income for child support, or
that the actual interest generated from an inheritance is income
for child support obligation purposes.' 2 Colorado held that income
includes an amount an inheritance could reasonably be expected
to generate for child support calculations, in the 1992 case of Arm-
strong v. Armstrong.'33 The policy consideration in Armstrong was
that if the marriage was intact the children would benefit from the
inheritance, and therefore, imputing income to the amount that an
inheritance could reasonably generate, was income for purposes of
child support calculations.' The statute in Colorado includes
payments from a financial resource as income, and the further
reduction in cost of living expenses would be considered for in-
creasing income available for support.'3' Therefore, the Armstrong
court concluded that interest could be imputed to the inheritance
to increase the income of the parent for child support calcula-
tions. 
136
129. Kern, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d at 883.
130. Id. at 884.
131. Id. at 884-85.
132. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 831 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1992); Halter v. Halter 959
S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1998); and Gainey v. Gainey, 948 P.2d 865 (Wash. 1997).
133. 831 P.2d 501 (Colo. App. 1972).
134. Id. at 502.




The Arkansas court held that income did not include inheri-
tances as a basis for determining child support, but that interest
could be imputed on the inherited sum for purpose of arriving at
an appropriate amount of support, in the 1998 decision in Halter
v. Halter.'37 The statutory definition of income for support obliga-
tions was based on the tax laws definition of income, which ex-
cludes inheritances from income for both tax and support calcula-
tions.' Although specifically excluded from income calculations,
inheritance interest is income under the definition in the tax code,
and should be included in a child support determination.1 39 Lastly,
Halter determined that any interest that might have been earned
on the principle amount of the inheritance could have been im-
puted to the income of the obligor spouse, which was under the
court discretion to impute.4 ° The conclusion was only based on
the statutory definition of income, and no consideration was made
regarding the appropriateness or availability of any deviation
from the support amount due to the inheritance.'
The Washington court held that gifts and inheritances are not
income, but interest earned on the gift or inheritance is income for
child support purposes in Gainey v. Gainey.'4' The issue was
whether the custodial parent's inheritance should affect the payor
spouse's support obligation.' The determinative factor was that
the language of the statutory definition of income for child support
did not include gifts, but included interest, and therefore an in-
heritance is a testamentary gift and not included as income for
child support purposes."' The Gainey court held that the corpus of
an inheritance is not income, but the actual interest generated
from an inheritance is income for purposes of child support calcu-
lations.'45 The court also noted that the trial court is not obligated
to include the corpus of an inheritance as income, but is obligated
to include interest generated as income for child support determi-
nations, and clarified that the current issue was not whether an
inheritance will allow deviation from the support scheduled
137. 959 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. App. 1998).
138. Id. at 762.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 761.
142. 948 P.2d 865 (Wash. App. 1997).





amount. '46 Therefore, Gainey held only that the interest actually
generated by an inheritance is income under the statutory defini-
tion, but no determination was made regarding the corpus of the
inheritance's effect on child support calculations for deviation from
the guideline amount." 7
In analyzing the statutory definition of income, the rules of
statutory construction, Pennsylvania case law regarding the
statutory definition of income, and the decisions in foreign juris-
dictions, it is clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's treat-
ment of an inheritance only changing the payor spouse's cost of
living as a basis for deviation is too narrow to properly allow a cor-
rect calculation of the effect of an inheritance on a child support
obligation. The outright exclusion of inheritances from the defini-
tion of income is based on a questionable statutory construction
scheme that is against all prior case law, the purpose of the child
support guidelines, and public policy.
The Supreme Court interpreted the statutory definition of in-
come as an express list in which an item must reasonably fit
within to be considered when making a child support order." 8
This interpretation, as applied to lump sum cash inheritances, is
dealt with in the blanket statement, "inheritance is one of the
most common means by which wealth is transferred, it defies logic
that the legislature would not have clearly provided for an inheri-
tance within the statutory definition of income if that were its in-
tent.""9 The rules of statutory interpretation do not include dicta
as a matter to be considered when the words of the statute are not
explicit, and in fact deal with specific considerations that the Su-
preme Court failed to incorporate into their interpretation of the
statute.' The first rule of statutory construction is that the object
of the interpretation of the court is to give all provisions effect and
to pinpoint and carry out the intention of the legislature.'5' The
Supreme Court's blanket exclusion of inheritances as income ne-
gates the purpose of the statutory definition of income's general-
ized phrases like: "other entitlements to money or lump sum
awards without regard to source, including lottery winnings" or
"any form of payment due to and collectable by an individual re-
146. Id.
147. Gainey, 948 P.2d at 865.
148. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 284.
149. Id. at 285
150. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (1995).
151. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(a).
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gardless of source" nor the more specific "income in respect of a
decedent" or "interest in an estate or trust" which are both given
generalized statements of non-applicability by the Supreme
Court.' The Court, by ignoring what seemed clear to the general
rules of child support calculations, created a category of income
that is now unavailable to meet the reasonable needs of minor de-
pendent children. Assuming that there is some basis for the Su-
preme Court's conclusion that the common means to transfer
wealth by way of inheritances proves the intent of the General
Assembly to exclude inheritances as income, then the general in-
clusionary clauses of regardless of source would most likely be fol-
lowed by specific exclusionary clauses that would make clear the
intent to expressly exclude inheritances, due to the overlapping
generalized inclusionary phrases that under the plain meaning of
the statute could be reasonably construed to include inheritances
as income. Without the express exclusion of inheritances through
the language of the statute, the court is left only with the 'common
transfer of wealth' explanation to show absent an express inclu-
sion, inheritances were intended to be excluded. DeRoss, decided
in 2002, is the first Pennsylvania case to deal with lump sum cash
inheritances and the impact on child support calculations since
the creation of the statutory definition of income in 1985. There-
fore by the cases very existence, it seemingly debunks the "com-
mon occurrence" theory of the Supreme Court in regards to child
support obligations. The plain meaning of the statutory definition
of income cannot be facially determined through the inclusion or
exclusion of any category to exclude inheritances. Furthermore,
the plain meaning is more likely to produce the inclusion of inheri-
tances through the regardless of source catchall categories in ab-
sence of express inheritance exemption.
The rules of statutory construction list factors to be considered
when the intent of the General Assembly is not explicit, including:
'occasion and necessity for the statute;" "mischief to be remedied;"
"object to be attained;" "former law if any..." and "consequences of
a particular interpretation."153 The application of these factors to a
lump sum cash inheritance lead to the conclusion that such an
inheritance is income for the purposes of child support calcula-
152. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302, See Humphreys, 790 A.2d 281, at 285. The court merely
states that the inheritance received by DeRoss is not applicable to these categories without
further analysis. Id.
153. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(c) (1995).
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tions. The "occasion and necessity" of the definition of the statute
was to create a formula for calculating child support to alleviate
the differential treatment of people who are otherwise correspond-
ingly situated while putting the primary focus on the needs of the
child and each parent's ability to pay.14 Part of the "necessity" for
the statute was to make both parents equally responsible for the
maintenance of their children. Pennsylvania's Support Guideline
is an Income Shares Model that focuses on the extent of income
between both parents that would have been available if the par-
ents were still together. 5 ' This focus negates the Supreme Court's
application of how intact verses non-intact families spend inheri-
tances which results in an arbitrary classification of minor chil-
dren's rights to be maintained based upon how their parent de-
cides to spend an inheritance.' The Supreme Court suggests that
if a parent invests an inheritance, the minor child has rights. If
the parents reduce their cost of living through an inheritance, the
minor child has rights. However, if a parent gambles, purchases
assets (whether basic living or not), or spends the inheritance on
non-necessities, then the minor child does not have rights to addi-
tional support.
The "mischief to be remedied" includes the ability of a parent to
make financial resource choices that would reduce the amount of
money that is available for support. The court is situated to be
able to make determinations based on the economic reality of the
parent and to be able to prevent a parent from hiding income in
what might otherwise be viewed as an asset."7 The uniformity of
obligations cannot be escaped by moving income into assets or
other avoidance techniques that would affect the court's determi-
nation of what is available for support. These concepts attach di-
rectly to the Supreme Court's determination that the corpus of an
estate is not income. When ignoring if the corpus is cash or prop-
erty, the obligor parent has the ability to practice avoidance of his
or her duty by either holding the asset until the child reaches ma-
jority or holding the cash in a non-interest bearing account or con-
verting it into a non-interest bearing asset.5 8 This cannot be the
legislative object to be attained by not expressly listing the corpus
154. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322(a).
155. Ball, 648 A.2d at 1197.
156. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 286.
157. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302. See "compensation in kind"; "pensions"; and "gains from
dealings in property."
158. Humphreys, 790 A.2d at 288.
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of an inheritance as an express provision of the statutory defini-
tion of income.
The former law is not statutory, but based on the well-
established common law principles, which set up the inescapable
duty to provide to the best of the parent's ability for the reason-
able needs of the child.'59 Once the Support Guidelines were es-
tablished, prior case law was used to determine the intent of the
General Assembly, and the codification of Darby demonstrated the
proper analysis of the statutory definition of income. 6 ' Judge
Joyce, in the Superior Court's treatment of Humphreys, rightly
states:
[t]his court has construed... section 4302 as providing exam-
ples... (the statutory definition of income) list is not intended
to be inclusive.. .Following Darby, the General Assembly es-
sentially codified this court's decision by amending the stat-
ute... the General Assembly had the opportunity to overturn
Darby if it disagreed with (the) interpretation of section 4203.
The fact that it did not do so, but incorporated our holding,




Joyce's overview of former law, its application, and the General
Assembly's response to the Superior Court's prior treatment of the
statutory definition of income as non-exclusive makes clear that
the principles of common law child support obligations are the ba-
sis for the legislature's statutory definition of income. The duty of
a parent to support his or her child cannot be avoided through a
narrow statutory interpretation scheme, hiding income in assets,
nor treating inheritances as an express exclusion from income
when a lump sum cash distribution has in fact occurred.
The consequences of the Supreme Court's interpretation are se-
vere when applied generally and uniformly to all parents who re-
ceive an inheritance as the purpose of the Support Guidelines re-
quire.'6 ' A ten million-dollar lump sum cash distribution would be
treated the same as DeRoss's eighty thousand plus distribution.
Under the same facts, a parent with only income from Social Secu-
rity and Worker Compensation could feasibly enjoy an extrava-
159. See supra note 56-61.
160. Darby, 686 A.2d at 1346.
161. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 783.
162. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322(a).
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gant standard of living while his minor child remains in need, as
long as he practiced avoidance of interest and the purchase of non-
income producing assets. This reality would indeed call into ques-
tion the Supreme Court's interpretation of excluding the corpus on
an inheritance as income and viewing only any reduction in the
cost of living, a reduction that most likely occur through an out-
right purchase of a basic living necessity. The court seems to en-
courage parents to buy assets after a cash inheritance so that the
cash is not invested or available outright for child support pay-
ments which allows the parent's asset to receive a higher level of
protection than the minor child. 3
The other disturbing consequence of the court's holding is that a
blanket exclusion of inheritances removes the trial court's discre-
tion to view the facts and circumstances of each case individually
to make the best determination for all parties involved. For exam-
ple, if DeRoss's inheritance was not spent until after the deviation
procedure, then the trial court could have awarded a lump sum
payment due to Angela that would have allowed DeRoss to invest
the remaining portion in his new home, a fair result to both par-
ties. In addition, the Supreme Court decision, by allowing devia-
tion only for the reduction in the cost of living resulting from the
inheritance, could also result in an asset based inheritance in-
creasing the cost of living for the inheriting parent through prop-
erty and other taxes as well as maintenance costs, which could
feasibly be used to reduce a child support obligation under the
court's interpretation. This result also seems clearly against public
policy, the purpose of the guidelines, and all prior case law regard-
ing the duty to provide for the reasonable needs of a minor child.
The Supreme Court could have held the inheritance as income
under the statutory definition of income under either of the "re-
gardless of source" catchall clauses, and the effect would have
been that when a parent receives an inheritance they would first
be obligated to determine the impact the inheritance has on their
duty of support before investing in assets or frivolously spending
the lump sum award. The court could have also imputed income
on the inherited amount to either encourage the parent to make a
supplemental lump sum payment of support or to invest and pay a
supplemental amount over time, before the parent could invest in
163. See Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 785. The court stated that it was unreasonable that




an non-interest producing asset. Allowing the trial court the dis-
cretion to serve both the parent and the minor child's reasonable
needs would not be unfair or confiscatory but would be in line with
the intent of the legislature to promote the duty of a parent to
provide in the support of their minor child's reasonable needs.
The majority instead removes the trial court's discretion for de-
termining whether an inheritance should have an effect on child
support obligations, depending upon the facts and circumstances
of each support case. The majority's treatment of inheritances ex-
empts parents from the tax of parenthood, unless the inheritance
is invested or substantially reduces the parent's cost of living,
which is clearly contrary to the intent of the General Assembly's
purpose in creating a statutory definition of income specifically for
child support determinations which includes general "regardless
of source" categories. The majority's exclusion of inheritances re-
sults in a clear violation of the well established rule that children
have a right to share in a parent's standard of living which, as the
Superior Court noted in Butler, "indeed, calls into question the
sanity of the law.. .to rule that the (lump sum award) is available
to pay debts to 'the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker'
but not the debt to.. .the child for support"" The court has failed
its parens patriae duty to both hold a parent accountable to the
imposed obligations of parenthood and to provide for the child's
best interest and welfare. It now remains up to the General As-
sembly to not do the same by rightfully returning the discretion to
the trial court to ensure the best interests and welfare of the child
are obtained though the enforcement of the parent's duty to pro-
vide for the reasonable needs of their dependent children, by ex-
pressly including inheritances in the statutory definition of in-
come.
Sarah Eckel*
164. Butler, 488 A.2d at 1143.
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